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Abstract 
What is the role of the imagination in scientific practice? Here I focus on the nature 
and role of invitations to imagine in certain scientific texts as represented by the 
example of Einstein’s Special Relativity paper from 1905. Drawing on related 
discussions in aesthetics, I argue, on the one hand, that this role cannot be simply 
subsumed under ‘supposition’ but that, on the other, concerns about the impact of 
genre and symbolism can be dealt with, and hence present no obstacle to regarding 
imagination as appropriately belief-like. By applying the framework of ‘semi-
propositional representations’ and ‘quasi-truth’ to this case I thereby offer a new 
unitary framework for understanding the epistemology of scientific imagination.	 
																																																								
* Versions of this paper were presented at the work-in-progress seminar of the Centre 
for History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Leeds and at the 26th 
Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association in Seattle. I am hugely 
grateful for the comments and helpful suggestions of Otávio Bueno, Amanda Bryant, 
Henk de Regt, Aaron Meskin, Alice Murphy, Juha Saatsi, Fiora Salis and Mike 
Stuart. As ever, they are not to be held accountable for what follows! 
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1. Introduction: Einstein’s Invitation 
Consider the following passage, taken from Einstein’s classic paper, ‘On the 
Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies’ (Einstein 1905):  
 
“Let there be given a stationary rigid rod; and let its length be l as measured by a 
measuring-rod which is also stationary. We now imagine the axis of the rod lying 
along the axis of x of the stationary system of co-ordinates, and that a uniform motion 
of parallel translation with velocity v along the axis of x in the direction of increasing 
x is then imparted to the rod. We now inquire as to the length of the moving rod, and 
imagine its length to be ascertained by the following two operations ...”  
 
The passage continues,  
 
 “We imagine further that at the two ends A and B of the rod, clocks are placed which 
synchronize with the clocks of the stationary system, that is to say that their 
indications correspond at any instant to the “time of the stationary system” at the 
places where they happen to be. These clocks are therefore “synchronous in the 
stationary system.” ...  
 
We imagine further that with each clock there is a moving observer, and that these 
observers apply to both clocks the criterion established in § 1 for the synchronization 
of two clocks.”  
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 Here we appear to have an explicit invitation to engage the imagination and 
what I’d like to explore here is the nature of that engagement and its place within this 
example of scientific practice.  Now, of course, the claim that imagination plays a role 
in scientific work is hardly a surprising conclusion but typically that role has been 
restricted in at least two senses, both to the heuristic phase of theory development, or 
what is sometimes called the ‘discovery’ stage (I’ll come back to this below) and to 
specific aspects of scientific practice. Recently, however, those restrictions have 
begun to relax in various ways. So, for example, the role of the imagination in thought 
experiments and crucially, how that might change our view of the latter, has come 
under further examination (Arcangeli 2010; Meynell 2014 and 2018; Murphy 
forthcoming; Salis	and	Frigg	forthcoming;	Stuart 2017, forthcominga and 
forthcomingb). And of course, the view of models as fictions has drawn on the role of 
the imagination in order to articulate those fictional aspects (see Frigg 2010; Salis and 
Frigg forthcoming; Toon 2012). However, in those cases we are invited to engage the 
imagination as part of a process of ‘make-believe’ (at least on the most well-known of 
such accounts), in which we imagine certain idealised elements of the model – such as 
the bob in a simple pendulum, swinging without air resistance – just as we imagine 
certain elements in a children’s game of make-believe or in a work of fiction more 
generally (for a critical analysis of this sort of account see Weisberg 2013).  
 In this paper, however, I will look at imagination in what at first sight, at least, 
appears to be a different context – namely, that of the presentation of a theory, via a 
journal publication (although it could also obviously be in a seminar or conference 
presentation or similar). Furthermore, I shall argue against certain views that might be 
construed as attempts to diminish the role of imagination by disassociating it from 
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belief in this context. In doing so, I shall adopt a framework that takes belief in p to be 
belief in the quasi-truth of p, where p is taken to be a ‘semi-propositional 
representation’ (da Costa and French 2003). This, I shall claim, opens up space for 
consideration of imagining as on a par with other elements of the relevant practice, 
such as proposing, entertaining and believing a theory or hypothesis and thus affords 
a greater appreciation of its role in that practice.  
 Before we consider such claims, however, there is a concern that needs to be 
dealt with ‘upfront’, as it were, lest it remain a nagging worry throughout the 
discussion. 
 
Context 
This concern has to do with the fact that Einstein’s original paper was, of course, 
written in German and so there might be a worry that the phrase “Wir denken uns nun 
die Stabachse ...” although standardly translated as “We now imagine the axis of the 
rod …”,1 could be understood as an invitation to simply engage in ‘thinking of’ for 
example, rather than as an invitation to imagine, per se.2 However, leaving aside the 
issue of why the accuracy of such a widespread and accepted translation should be 
doubted or why the translators would insist on using ‘imagine’ in this case when 
English alternatives are available, although ‘denken' can indeed be translated as 
'think', it is more appropriately read as 'imagine' when it is in the reflexive form, as it 																																																								
1 This is how it is translated in (Einstein 1989) for example, by Anna Beck who 
translated the first five volumes of The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, published 
by Princeton University Press.  
2 I’d like to thank Otávio Bueno, Juha Saatsi and an anonymous referee for pressing 
me on this issue. 
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is here.3 Having said that, there is also a sense in which this concern is a bit of a ‘red 
herring’. Whatever Einstein’s own intentions were in writing the original phrase, the 
English text itself has been widely reproduced and has had an enormous impact, so I 
shall take it as my example of an invitation to imagine in a scientific paper.4  
 Nevertheless, this offers a convenient point at which to reflect on the nature of 
imagining more generally.5 There is, not surprisingly, a huge literature on this and 
little in the way of consensus when it comes to an appropriate taxonomy that covers 
all the different kinds of imaginings (for a useful overview see Liao and Gendler 
2019). For my purposes, it will be useful to distinguish, at least initially, between 
sensory or imagistic imagination and propositional imagination (ibid; see also 
Arcangeli 2018 who draws the distinction between ‘sensory’ and ‘cognitive’ 
imagination). The former is concerned with the formation of mental images in some 
sensory modality – typically visual – and indeed, such imagery has historically been 
taken to be constitutive of imagining (Liao and Gendler op. cit.).6 This historical force 
has been resisted, however, and propositional imagination, in which one represents to 																																																								
3 This has been confirmed by various people with the appropriate grasp of German, 
including a leading expert in the history and philosophy of space-time theory, to all of 
whom I am grateful! 
4 Nevertheless, the general concern about the legitimacy of translation and 
interpretation in this context should not be dismissed. As well as linguistic differences 
there have also been historical shifts in scientists’ attitudes towards the imagination 
(see for example Illife 2018). 
5 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this.  
6 Todd argues that imagery can have important cognitive value because of its 
connection with certain affective states that themselves possess cognitive import. 
Thus, thought experiments, considered via the imagination, may evoke certain quasi-
sensory intuitions on the basis of which new beliefs can be formed (Todd 2020).  
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oneself that something is the case, does not involve such imagery. The mental state 
typically taken to be the counterpart to sensory imagination is perception and the 
counterpart to propositional imagination is belief. However, the manner in which 
imagination and belief differ is also a matter of debate (again, see Liao and Gendler 
op. cit.). Both can be understood as cognitive attitudes involving representation, but 
some have argued that the latter but not the former aims for the truth, whereas others 
have rejected this distinction. Some have tried to characterise the difference in terms 
of their connection to action, or lack thereof. Some have argued that belief and 
imagination lie on a continuum and still others maintain that the latter is ultimately 
reducible to the former. As we’ll see, the framework I shall offer here blurs, at the 
very least, the purported distinction in terms of truth and, given the notion of belief in 
play, might be read, weakly, as compatible with the continuum view, or more strongly 
as reductive in nature. Finally, hybrid accounts have also been proposed, according to 
which ‘…imaginings have complex contents, only part of which are accounted for by 
the contribution of one or more mental images ’ (Langland-Hassan 2015, p. 679). As 
we’ll also see, there is a sense in which the imagining that Einstein invites us to 
engage in might be regarded as an example of this hybrid form.7 
																																																								
7 Thus referring back to the translation of ‘denken’, it would be too quick to say that 
‘thinking’ and ‘imagining’ can be distinguished by virtue of the fact that the latter 
goes hand in hand with visualisation, whereas the former does not. Of course if that 
were the case, it would provide further support for taking what Einstein wrote as an 
invitation to imagine since, as we’ll see, it can be understood as involving a sensory 
element. Again I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this issue regarding 
the distinction between ‘imagining’ and ‘thinking’. 
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 Let us now move on to consider the question, what is involved in accepting 
such an invitation to imagine? 
 
2. Instruction and Intention 
In formulating an answer to this question, we might draw on other such invitations, as 
implicitly made in works of fiction for example. Thus Stock in her account of 
fictional content, writes that “... a fiction is a set of instructions from authors to 
readers or hearers, instructing them to imagine various things as part of a single 
scenario.” (Stock 2017, 174).8  
 One might be tempted to say, similarly, that ‘A theory is a set of instructions 
from scientists to readers or hearers, instructing them to imagine various things ...’ but 
that would lead us into a contentious debate over what theories are (see, for example, 
French and Vickers 2011; French 2020). Nevertheless, we can regard the presentation 
of a theory, or theoretical hypothesis, whether in a talk or in a published paper, as 
embodying certain instructions in Stock’s sense and indeed, Einstein does seem to be 
giving us, the reader, explicit instructions to imagine here, as when he writes,  “We 
imagine that at the two ends of the rod a clock is placed ...” The relevant scenario is 
obviously the arrangement of rods and clocks and here we are being told to imagine 
specific details of this arrangement.  
 However, one might balk at this importation of a certain understanding of 
fictions from the philosophy of art into the philosophy of science. It could be argued 
that Einstein’s use of ‘imagine’ in these passages is merely a rhetorical flourish and 																																																								
8 Stock defends a position known as ‘extreme intentionalism’ which holds that the 
content of a work of fiction is determined by what the author of that work intended 
the reader to imagine. I do not advocate such a position here.  
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that his invitation is actually to entertain a supposition, rather than to imagine per se. 
If this were the case, the passage from Einstein’s paper would be much less 
noteworthy and our considerations here correspondingly less interesting! Let us then 
consider this further distinction that is sometimes made between imagining and 
supposing. 
 
3. Imagination vs. Supposition 
As with imagination, there is a huge literature on the nature of supposition and the 
distinction, if any, between the two. Although both may be viewed as similar sorts of 
mental activity (see Arcangeli (2017) for a useful survey of the various positions in 
play), imagination is typically taken to be capable of producing an affect, such as fear 
or desire and so on, whereas supposition does not. Supposition on the other hand is 
claimed to be relatively unconstrained, whereas imagination is constrained in various 
ways – we can suppose contradictions for example but, it is claimed, we cannot 
imagine them (see also Salis forthcoming).9 Supposition is also understood to be 
‘coarse-grained’ and lacking embellishment, as befits an attitude involved in 
counterfactual considerations, whereas imagination is taken to be more detailed and 
complex. Thus it might be suggested that what is going on in Einstein’s paper is 
actually an invitation to ‘suppose’ rather than imagine per se.  
 Indeed, it has been argued that conflating supposing and imagining in the 
scientific context blurs certain important differences: 
 
																																																								
9 The likes of Priest, of course, would disagree (Priest 2006). 
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‘Theorizing in empirical matters consists in employing something like the 
hypothetico-deductive model, whereas imagination does not. Imagination essentially 
involves forming quasi-sensory mental representations, whereas theorizing does not. 
Moreover, [the] view that supposition is a kind of imagination implies that the 
cognitive activity in dreaming or daydreaming is different only in degree, not in kind, 
from the cognitive activity involved in, say, constructing models in theoretical 
physics. This is implausible, though.’ (Spaulding 2016, 220)  
 
 The contrast here is with a rather narrow view of ‘theorizing’ and many would 
accept that the relevant practices cover a wide range of activities and methodological 
devices, that cannot be straightforwardly captured in terms of a hypothetico-
deductivist framework.  If such practices are taken to include model construction 
more generally, it is not so implausible to suggest that what goes on such construction 
is only different in degree from what goes on when a scientist day-dreams, the 
creative significance of which is well-known.10 More significantly for what I shall 
say below, it is also not obvious that a clear line can be drawn between imagination 
and what is called ‘theorizing’ above when it comes to the involvement of ‘quasi-
sensory mental representations’.  
 Certainly, on the face of it, the passages from Einstein’s paper above do reveal 
an aspect of his practice that seems to explicitly involve imagination. Granted the 
previous considerations about translation, to dismiss this as mere rhetoric might be 
																																																								
10 The exercise of the imagination in day-dreaming is taken to have a spontaneous 
element but one might argue that something similar takes place in model building, 
particularly with regard to its exploratory aspects. 
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viewed as a refusal to take the language used in scientific practice11 seriously, 
something we would do well to avoid. 
 However, perhaps the crucial argument against drawing a firm distinction 
between imagination and supposition is that it leads to an unnecessary multiplication 
of mental kinds (cf. Gendler 2000). The view mentioned and dismissed as implausible 
in the passage cited above avoids such a cost by taking imagining to embrace 
supposing. Thus, Arcangeli (2018) argues that supposition should be regarded as a 
type of imagination, but one that is sui generis, standing distinct from both cognitive 
and sensory imagination in terms of its lack of constraint, emotional affect etc. as 
indicated above. Supposition, she maintains, is also a propositional attitude and the 
inferential relations holding between suppositions are similar to those that hold 
between beliefs. However, unlike belief, supposition, by virtue of being a speculative 
metal state, does not aim for the truth. Stock, on the other hand, argues that 
supposition can be regarded as a form of cognitive imagining but one that has a 
distinctive role in helping to determine the identity of the imaginative scenarios in 
which it features (Stock 2017). As for the claims that supposition is unconstrained as 
compared with imagination, or is coarse grained, affectless and so on, she argues that 
we should take these apparent characteristics as merely contingent and contextual 
features, given certain accompanying purposes, goals & uses (ibid., 202-207; for a 
critical response see Arcangeli 2017). Indeed, she suggests, these characteristics have 
been mistakenly regarded as distinctive primarily because of the general use of 
supposition in counterfactual reasoning.  It is in precisely those situations, where the 
exercise of the imagination tends to be terse, focussed and lacking in detail, that there 																																																								
11 I am also taking this broadly, to include the language of texts such as the English 
translation of Einstein’s paper. 
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is a tendency to refer to it as ‘supposition’. However, in other contexts, such as we 
find in fictional works, she maintains, supposition can be constrained, detailed and 
accompanied by appropriate emotions. 
 What about scientific works? Setting to one side the issue of emotional 
engagement with aspects of such works (but see Arcangeli and Dokic 2020), 
supposition is clearly not entirely unconstrained in this context, given the roles of 
background knowledge and assorted heuristic factors (for a classic consideration of 
the latter see Post 1971). It will also be more or less fine-grained, depending on the 
particular features of that scientific context. These brief considerations suggest that 
Stock’s context dependent view of supposition meshes better with scientific practice. 
Returning to Einstein’s paper, then, and following her account, we might take the core 
principles of relativity and constancy of the velocity of light – clearly constrained by a 
well-known variety of factors – as playing a suppositional role in her sense as they 
effectively delineate the relevant imaginative scenario – it is within that scenario that 
we are then invited to imagine the rods and clocks translated in a certain direction and 
so on. Indeed, in the context of this paper, we can see supposition and both cognitive 
and sensory imagination working together: having established the relevant scenario 
via the principles of relativity and constancy of velocity of light, understood as 
hypothetical in the appropriate sense, we are then invited to imagine their 
counterfactual consequences in terms of a certain scenario that does indeed involve 
certain ‘quasi-sensory’ elements insofar as it is articulated in terms of the familiar 
elements of clocks and rods (again, I’ll come back to this). 
 
4. Imagination vs. Belief 
	 12	
However, even if one were to concede that a hard and fast distinction between 
imagination and supposition is difficult to maintain, one might still insist that 
imagining occupies a distinctive role in the presentation and reading of a scientific 
theory insofar as it is not ‘belief-like’. Here it is typically maintained that imagining is 
normally conscious, voluntary and under our intentional control, whereas belief does 
not possess these features. Beliefs also motivate us to take action, whereas 
imagination does not – it is ‘quarantined’ (Salis forthcoming). The content of our 
imagining is also typically taken to be inhomogeneous in nature and, it has been 
argued, the ‘imaginative path’ taken does not necessarily proceed in a ‘belief like’ 
manner (Stock 2017, 177-178); that is, this path does not proceed via interaction with 
the usual inferential mechanisms that govern belief (cf. Currie and Ravenscroft 2002; 
Weinberg and Meskin 2006).12   
 When it comes to fictions, the basis for this last claim is two-fold. First, it is 
argued that the genre that such a work falls under will reinforce certain implied but 
unstated truths that the reader is encouraged to acknowledge during her reading.  
Fictional genres, such as science-fiction, or horror, or crime, are governed (in some 
sense) by certain conventions (Stock 2017, pp. 68-74). And these conventions may, 
whether explicitly, through the publishers’ blurb on the back of the book, say, or 
implicitly, through the reader’s expectations, ‘… hermeneutically reinforce the 
reader’s confidence about what fictional truths are implied but unstated in the text.’ 
(ibid., p. 74). At first glance, at least, such ‘hermeneutic reinforcement’ does not 
obviously mesh with the more straightforward ‘inferential pathways’ that one 
associates with belief. 																																																								
12 Again, these mechanisms may be more varied when it comes to what goes on in 
science than certain commentators appreciate.  
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 Furthermore, it is also argued, such imaginings may also incorporate certain 
symbolic elements that likewise cannot be accommodated via the usual belief related 
mechanisms. So, for example, suppose you are reading Jane Eyre and imagine that 
Jane is locked in a red room. You may believe that Brontë’s use of a red room here 
was intended to symbolize a womb and thus you may then infer that Jane was affected 
by the loss of her mother. However, the content of your initial imagining and that of 
your belief are not true with regard to the same scenario. The first concerns an orphan 
girl and future wife of Rochester while the second has to do with the events – 
understood as fictional constructs – of a book written by Brontë. Thus, ‘[t]here is little 
obvious sense in which these two kinds of thought, one imaginative and one a belief, 
come into direct inferential content: for they take different scenarios as objects (the 
imaginary scenario of the novel, and the actual world, respectively).’ (Stock 2017, p. 
179). 
 Now, if imagination could be pulled away from belief in this manner, that 
would raise concerns as to whether it could be said to play an integral role in 
scientific practice of the sort that we find in Einstein’s paper. It might even encourage 
the claim that such invitations to imagine should be dismissed as mere rhetoric. 
However, as we’ll now see, by extending a certain formal framework of belief in the 
scientific context to accommodate imagining we can better understand its role and by 
closer consideration of that context we can overcome the above obstacles to a belief-
like imaginative path. 
 
5. Clocks and Rods and ‘Hooks’ 
Let us recall: imagining is supposedly not belief-like insofar as it is under our control 
and quarantined, its contents are inhomogeneous and the inferential path it takes does 
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not proceed in an appropriately straightforward manner, due to the intervention of 
genre and symbolism.  
 In response, let us begin with a similar distinction that has been made between 
belief and acceptance, as articulated in terms of belief being essentially passive and 
involuntary in nature, whereas acceptance also involves a conscious and voluntary 
choice (Cohen 1989; see also Elgin 2017 pp. 18-20). Beliefs, it is claimed, come over 
us ‘willy-nilly’, as it were, whereas acceptance involves an element of commitment. 
Likewise, when one imagines, or begins to imagine something, there is a commitment 
to the central features of that particular imagining, the consequences of which are then 
followed via the ‘imaginative path’ mentioned above. The parallel can be taken to 
provide further fuel for the claim that imagination is not ‘belief-like’.  
 However, when it comes to scientific practice, there are obvious concerns 
about divorcing acceptance from belief in this manner, not the least of which is that it 
raises the spectre of rendering theory choice arbitrary or a matter of convention. One 
could appeal to the standard theoretical virtues in response (Schindler 2018) but of 
course their role in theory choice is contentious. Ultimately, it would seem, any 
attempt to assuage the concern must appeal, at some stage, to the ‘observational 
element’ of scientific knowledge (Cohen op. cit., p. 386).  But then, granted the 
much-discussed intricacies of experimentation and observation, ultimately, again, this 
does, of course, involve belief. Hence some connection, even if only indirect, between 
belief and acceptance can be restored, via this grounding in observation, albeit 
mediated. I’ll return to that connection shortly but first let me note that we can draw a 
further comparison here with the kinds of invitations to imagine that we find in 
examples such as Einstein’s paper. 
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  Here too we can find something akin to these ‘observational elements’, 
namely the ‘quasi-sensory’ aspects of the imagining noted above. In the case of 
Einstein’s paper specifically, we have the clocks and rods with whose behaviour we 
are expected to be familiar. The emphasis on these, as in the passages quoted at the 
beginning of this paper, has in the past been used to support the view that Einstein, at 
this stage of his career, displayed positivistic tendencies, a view that has since been 
dismissed (see for example Howard 2017). Nevertheless, the significance, both 
epistemological and physical, of the clocks and rods should not be downplayed. 
Understood as primitive they imbue the space-time interval with a physical 
significance that was carried over into the General Theory, in effect providing 
gravity-independent grounds for that theory. Crucially, and fundamentally, Einstein 
stipulated the clocks to be ‘perfect’ and the rods as ‘practically rigid’, qualities that 
the Special Theory itself ruled out for the corresponding physical entities (Shapere 
1969). Thus as idealised entities these clocks and rods could only be imagined and it 
is for this reason that Einstein phrases these passages in this manner.13 
 It is by virtue of this significance that these elements function as the ‘hooks’ 
on which one can hang the ‘belief-like’ features of this particular case of an invitation 
to imagine. Of course such hooks may not be and typically will not be present in all 
cases of imagining but here I am concerned only with its role in scientific contexts.14 																																																								
13 Sorensen (2013) argues that all idealisations are suppositions and holds that the 
latter are not belief-like, since false suppositions – such as idealisations – can still be 
useful, whereas false beliefs are a different kettle of epistemic fish. The framework of 
‘quasi-truth’ to be presented below embraces both. 
14 This is a feature shared with at least some examples of thought experiments; see 
Murphy forthcoming.  
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Furthermore, by placing such elements within the imagination, as it were, the reader 
is encouraged to consider them as stripped of unnecessary or irrelevant detail, so that 
their function can be more readily grasped.15 And as just indicated, that function is to 
act as primitive and idealised elements that have a quasi-sensory nature. 
 
6. Restoring the Connection Between Acceptance and Belief 
What, then, is the connection between acceptance and belief when it comes to 
scientific theory choice? And how might we appropriate it to render imagination 
‘belief-like’? Here I shall draw on elements of the framework of ‘quasi-‘ or partial- 
truth as set out in (da Costa and French 2003). 
 Thus, underpinning the relevant discussions of belief and acceptance is a 
common assumption that belief should be cashed out as belief that p, where p is some 
proposition, taken to be true. Likewise, this assumption threads through debates over 
the nature of (propositional or more broadly, cognitive) imagination and whether it 
may be regarded as belief-like. However in both cases, it can be argued that ‘p’ 
should be taken to be more complex, less ‘homogeneous’, as open-ended and so on 
and less directly tied to the evidence such that ‘belief that p’ is not involuntary and 
thus distinct from ‘accept that p’ in the manner of the above claim (da Costa and 
French 2003, Ch. 2). What is needed, then, is a characterisation of the subject of our 
beliefs, that is, the ‘p’ in ‘belief that p’, that can accommodate the above features that 
have been taken to support the claims that neither acceptance nor imagination is 
belief-like, as we have seen.  
																																																								
15 Again, a useful comparison might be made with certain thought experiments, such 
as Newton’s bucket for example.  
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 Here we might usefully draw on another example, this time from 
anthropology: during his years of field-work in Ethiopia, Sperber encountered an old 
man who urged him to kill a dragon that he imagined (crucially) to live not far away. 
Couched in terms of propositions that must be regarded as true or false, the man’s 
belief in the existence of a dragon might appear irrational. However, Sperber resists 
such a dismissal and instead argues that an appropriate epistemic attitude should be 
adopted but that the object of such an attitude should not be regarded as strictly 
propositional in character. Instead, he suggests, we should replace p above with what 
he calls a ‘semi-propositional representation’ (Sperber 1982). 
 Now, these are 'conceptual representations' that do not have fully fixed 
propositional content and may be ‘entertained’, as conceptual possibilities, say. They 
are generally not ‘homogeneous’, may even accommodate inconsistencies, and in 
suggesting a range of interpretations are heuristically fruitful and open-ended. Thus, 
Sperber writes that,   
 
' ... a semi-propositional representation can be given as many propositional 
interpretations as there are ways of specifying the conceptual content of its 
elements. In principle, one of these interpretations is the proper one: it 
identifies the proposition to which the semi-propositional representation is 
intended to correspond.' (Sperber 1982, 169) 
 
On this basis a further distinction can then be drawn between ‘factual’ beliefs, where 
there is awareness only of (what to the subject is) a fact and ‘representational’ beliefs, 
where there is awareness of a commitment to a representation. The rationality of 
holding the former can be cashed out in terms of evidential support directly involving 
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observation, whereas that of holding representational beliefs of semi-propositional 
content is to be explicated in terms of a warrant that is mediated in certain ways, 
including via the beliefs of other epistemic agents (da Costa and French 2003, Ch. 4). 
Thus, we may hold a factual belief in the proposition 'the snow is white', where this is 
understood as believing that 'the snow is white' is true, in the correspondence sense, 
given the evidence of our senses. And both we and a high energy physicist, say, may 
believe, 'representationally', that 'quarks are coloured', given the respective mediations 
of the warrant for that belief: for us it may involve our epistemic dependence on, and 
trust in, the physicist who asserts such a sentence, whereas for the latter it will 
embrace a variety of well-known inter-theoretical and, crucially, theory-evidence 
relationships  (ibid.). In both cases, the chain of epistemic dependence terminates in a 
factual belief of some kind, associated with the relevant evidence. This distinction 
between factual and representational beliefs can then be deployed in the context of 
theory choice, with Sperber’s notion of a ‘semi-propositional representation’ 
formalised in terms of partial structures, taken to represent scientific theories within 
the framework of the Semantic Approach  (da Costa and French 2003). This can in 
turn be extended to accommodate imaginative episodes in scientific practice, as 
represented by the example of Einstein’s paper above. 
 
7. Imagination and Quasi-truth  
Thus, it has been argued, scientific (theoretical) beliefs in general can be understood 
as representational beliefs, in precisely the above sense; that is, in p as quasi-true, 
where this latter notion can be formalised à la Tarski via so-called ‘partial structures’ 
(ibid.). The formal details are as follows (see da Costa and French 1990 and, again, 
2003): 
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 A partial structure is a set-theoretic construct A = <D, Ri>i∈I, where D is a non-
empty set and each Ri is a partial relation. A partial relation Ri over D is a relation 
which is not necessarily defined for all n-tuples of elements of D (see da Costa and 
French 1990, p. 255). Each partial relation R can be viewed as an ordered triple <R1, 
R2, R3>, where R1, R2, and R3 are mutually disjoint sets, with R1 ∪ R2 ∪ R3 = An, and 
such that: R1 is the set of n-tuples that (we take to) belong to R; R2 is the set of n-
tuples that (we take) do not belong to R, and R3 is the set of n-tuples for which it is not 
defined whether they belong or not to R.16 
We can then define a notion of quasi-truth (see, again, da Costa and French 
2003) as follows: If B is a total structure, whose relations of arity n are defined for all 
n-tuples of elements of its universe and the language L of the partial structure A is 
also interpreted in B, and P is a set of accepted sentences, then B is said to be A-
normal if: 
(i)  the universe of B is A; 
(ii) the relations of B extend the corresponding partial relations of A; 
(iii) if c is an individual constant of L then in both A and B c is interpreted 
by the same element; 
(iv) if s ∈ P, then B |= s. 
In other words, loosely speaking, a total structure B is called A-normal if it has the 
same similarity type as A, its relations extend the corresponding partial relations of 
A, and the sentences of P are true, in the Tarskian sense, in B. Then a sentence s is 																																																								
16 If we have two such partial structures, partial isomorphisms can be defined between 
them, allowing us to capture, it is claimed, both the inter-theoretical and theory-
evidence relations mentioned above (Bueno 1997; French and Ladyman 1999). 
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said to be quasi-true in A, or in the domain D that A partially reflects, if there is an 
interpretation I of L (and consequently of s) in an A-normal structure B and s is true 
in the Tarskian sense in B. Clearly, A is not conceived of as reflecting the (total) 
structure of D, but as only partially mirroring this domain. Thus the partial structure 
A has to capture some fundamental aspects of D, or some ‘elements of truth’, 
although it does not mirror D perfectly. Then, we can say that s is quasi-true in A, if 
all logical consequences of s are compatible with any true primary statement in P. In 
other words, s is quasi-true in the partial structure A if there exists an A-normal B in 
which s is true, in the correspondence sense. If s is not quasi-true in A according to 
B, then s is said to be quasi-false in A according to B.  
 Hence, in a report of a representational belief of the form 'belief that p', 
the suggestion is that the sentence p should be regarded as partially or quasi- 
true in the above sense, while the semi-propositional content of such beliefs 
is formally expressed by the relevant partial structure which in representing 
our (partial) knowledge of the domain concerned is the object of the belief. 
My claim is that by means of this framework we can also accommodate the 
way in which the subject of the imaginative endeavour is not homogeneous, 
is open-ended and can be regarded as quasi-true.  
 First of all, the distinction between ‘factual’ and representational’ 
belief nicely meshes with invitations to imagine of the specific kind we are 
considering here and with p understood in terms of such semi-propositional 
representations in the imaginative context we can restore the connection between 
imagination and belief. Furthermore, the relevant ‘semi-propositional 
representation’, as formalized via a partial structure, will contain various 
	 21	
elements and as indicated above, is open-ended in that it supports a range of 
propositional interpretations. 
 
8. Back on the Imaginative Path 
What about the claim that beliefs motivate action whereas imaginings do not, and are 
effectively ‘quarantined’? It goes without saying that the imagination may motivate 
action in a broad sense but the claim has to do with the phenomenon whereby the 
attitudes involved in an imagined state of affairs are typically not taken to be relevant 
to guiding action in actuality (again see Liao and Gendler 2019 for further 
discussion).  Nevertheless, ‘contagion’ may sometimes occur, as when the content of 
an imagining ends up shaping our perceptions or beliefs in general (ibid.). And again 
the above framework would seem able to accommodate this: consider Sperber’s 
‘dragon’ case, for example. Here we can speculate that the old man’s request that 
Sperber kill the purported dragon, understood in terms of a semi-propositional 
representation, was motivated by some imagining or other, itself conditioned by 
background knowledge, including certain traditional and cultural beliefs. We can 
further extend this form of imaginative contagion to scientific cases, such as 
Blondlot’s infamous but erroneous claim to have discovered ‘N-rays’ (see 
https://www.aps.org/publications/apsnews/200708/history.cfm). Here we might 
suggest that Blondlot’s imagining of ray-like phenomena, conditioned by the recent 
discovery of x-rays, led him to ‘perceive’ such phenomena in his laboratory (see also 
Nye 1980). Again, the nature of the relevant belief in this case can be appropriately 
characterised as ‘representational’ in the above sense. Whether ‘contagious’ 
imaginings can play a more positive role in science is a matter for another occasion 
but the point I wish to emphasise here is that imaginings may not always be 
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quarantined – and so this distinction from belief may also be eroded – and that when 
they are not, the framework of semi-propositional representations can also 
accommodate them. 
 That still leaves the claim that the relevant ‘imaginative path’ is not ‘belief-
like’.  We recall that this is because, in fictional imaginings, at least, genre and 
symbolism conspire to push us off such a belief-like path.  Here we need to consider 
carefully the extent, if any, to which these features can be carried over into science 
and whether, if they can, the scientific imaginative path is such that either feature 
could compel us to regard that path as not ‘belief-like’. As we’ll see, in the case of 
genre, we can answer that it does not so compel us whereas when it comes to 
symbolism, it can be argued that this cannot be carried over at all, at least not in the 
same form. 
 So, consider the way in which the ‘genre’ of a fictional work is supposed to 
take the reader off the well-beaten inferential path associated with belief, as noted 
above. It does this by means of the implicit assumptions associated with the genre: we 
don’t need further justification why the chap with the elongated incisors bursts into 
flame in a horror novel, for example. A particular genre introduces its own kinds of 
objects and tropes – vampires and zombies, for example, or aliens and spaceships – 
together with its own set of criteria for evaluating the veracity of claims about such 
objects. A given genre is thus ‘self-authenticating’ in the sense that it provides its own 
criteria for what is justifiable, although those criteria may be more or less flexible 
(compare, for example, the zombies of The Walking Dead, comic and tv show, with 
those of the movie 28 Days Later). Granted that, genres are typically stable over time, 
having developed their own means of adjusting to changes and pressures, both 
internal and external. 
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 With these characteristics in mind, we might usefully compare this notion of 
‘genre’ with Crombie’s idea of ‘styles of reasoning’ in science, in the sense of 
distinctive ways of scientific knowing that emerge at certain points in the history of 
science (Crombie 1994). He identified six, taken to be neither exclusive nor 
exhaustive: postulational, experimental, hypothetical, taxonomic, probabilistic and 
statistical, and historical or genetic. As with genre in fiction, such styles 
‘hermeneutically reinforce’ our confidence about what truths are implied but unstated 
in the relevant scientific practice. Hacking then famously claimed that these styles 
introduced new kinds of objects and new criteria for the truth or falsity of statements 
about those objects (for a comparative analysis see Sciortino 2017). Furthermore, he 
argued, a given style is self-authenticating in the sense that it defines its own criteria 
of validity and objectivity, and it also develops its own techniques of stabilisation. 
Finally, he insists that each style is grounded in our cognitive capacities that are the 
product of both evolution and cultural development. 
 Apart from that last feature, there seems to be a straightforward comparison 
with the outline of genres sketched above. The first of Hacking’s claims is obviously 
contentious in the scientific context (for further consideration see Ruphy 2016)17 but 
perhaps less so in that of literary genres, as already suggested. And both fictional 
genres fiction and scientific ‘styles’ can be seen as self-authenticating and self-
stabilising.  What this illuminates is that the more straightforward ‘imaginative path’ 
against which the unfolding of imagination in fiction is compared may not be present 
in science either and hence simply pointing to the existence of genre or styles of 																																																								
17 A realist would of course insist that although such a ‘style of reasoning’ may offer 
new ways of describing or conceptualising certain objects, it does not bring such 
objects into existence.  
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reasoning is not sufficient to demonstrate that the relevant imagining is not ‘belief-
like’. Indeed, if such genres or styles are regarded, rather broadly perhaps, as 
constraints,18 then their impact on the imaginative path might be less disruptive than 
initially thought – certainly in the scientific case, at least.  
 In that case, that scientific beliefs are constrained or even shaped by 
appropriate conventions or may be considered to be embodied in particular research 
programmes or overarching theoretical frameworks and so on is, of course, hardly 
contentious.  In the relativistic case, for example, we might appeal to Lorentz 
invariance as the appropriate constraint, in the context of the associated significance 
given to symmetry principles in general. In the specific example of Einstein’s paper 
we might take the equivalent of ‘genre’ to be embodied in his adoption of what 
Crombie calls the ‘postulational’ style as reflected in the way he presents the 
constancy of the speed of light, for example, as already considered above, as well as 
in the commitment to Maxwellian electrodynamics, with the various implicit truths 
thereby implied. Indeed, we have already noted that the scientific imagination in 
general is constrained in various ways like this, together with the role of background 
theoretical and experimental knowledge (Salis forthcoming; Stuart forthcomingb).19 
																																																								
18 Dubrow (1982) rejects the idea that genres have a deterministic impact, or that 
readers’ reaction to them can be codified in an ‘if/then’ pattern; rather, she suggests a 
genre might be usefully compared to a human personality, not least in displaying 
certain traits in different ways and in incorporating traits from different personality 
types while still conforming to one such type (ibid., p. 117).  
19 It has also been argued that some kinds of imaginative exercises do follow a certain 
kind of logic (Berto 2018). Having said that, such a ‘logic’ and the relevant 
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Insofar as ‘genre’ supposedly blocks the consideration of imagination as belief-like, 
when it is exported across into the scientific domain in the form of styles of reasoning 
or, less contentiously, theoretical programmes, any such obstacle appears to dissipate.  
 When it comes to symbolism, on the other hand, and its role in disrupting the 
‘imaginative path’, one might worry that this cannot be accommodated quite so 
straightforwardly. Recall the example from Jane Eyre, when Jane is locked in a red 
room, where this meant to symbolise the womb, from which, in conjunction with 
other elements, we are supposed to infer that she is affected by the loss of her mother. 
The claim is that two kinds of thought are involved here – the imagining of Jane in the 
red room and the belief that this is intended to symbolise the womb – but they do not 
come into direct inferential contact, involving as they do different scenarios (Stock 
2017, pp. 178-179).  
 However, it is not at all clear that we are ever expected to make such moves 
when it comes to scientific practices. Consider another example from the world of art, 
namely that of ‘vanitas’ paintings from the Netherlands in the 16th and 17th centuries. 
There we find certain elements within the painting – typically a still-life of some sort 
–  that are supposed to symbolize the futility of life and the inevitably of our death, 
where these elements may be explicit, such as skulls or skeletons, or less so, as in a 
lemon, half peeled, apparently standing for time passing and the bitterness of life. 
Now, recent years have seen numerous attempts to construct accounts of 
representation that are capable of embracing representation in both art and science 
and within certain of those accounts such symbolic elements have been 
accommodated, in one form or another. Thus, for example, Frigg and Nguyen’s 																																																								
constraints more generally should be understood as context specific and not 
straightforwardly generalisable as norms (Stuart forthcomingb).  
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influential ‘DEKI’ account incorporates the notion of a ‘key’ that, in effect, unpacks 
the relevant symbol for us (Frigg and Nguyen 2017). In the case they examine – that 
of a painting of an 18th century noblewoman – it is the small dog in the picture that is 
‘keyed up’ to represent fidelity; in the example of the ‘vanitas’ paintings above it 
would obviously be the half-peeled lemon to which the relevant key would apply.20 
Obviously, the ‘shape’ of the key, as it were, and the ability to unpack the symbolism 
will depend on a complex nexus of relevant background knowledge, including certain 
cultural conventions and presuppositions (and in such cases consideration of the 
relevant genre – still-life paintings for example – might be relevant). So, in the case of 
a lemon, viewers of such a painting in the 17th century would immediately appreciate 
that such a relatively exotic fruit, not native to the Netherlands, was indicative of 
some degree of wealth (Sonneman 2012) and anyone who has tasted one, whether in 
the 17th century or today, would appreciate the connection to bitterness! 
 Do we encounter anything along these lines when it comes to scientific 
theories or models? It would seem not. This is not to suggest, of course, that science 
does not deal with symbols. As with the words on the page in a work of fiction, 
certain marks in a paper or book or on a whiteboard are taken to denote certain 
physical properties. But typically what the symbol stands for here is given explicitly; 
so, in the case of Einstein’s paper with which we began, we are told upfront that v 
stands for velocity. More generally, it would seem that by virtue of not incorporating 
elements that are ‘keyed up’ in the above manner, scientific representations differ 
from artistic ones. In other words, when it comes to texts like the 1905 paper, we 
don’t have features like that of Jane Eyre’s ‘red room’ that require us to make this 																																																								
20 As well as transience and the underlying bitterness of mortal life, lemons were also 
taken to represent fidelity, apparently. 
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move of inferring a ‘hidden’ interpretation of some kind, based on some implicit 
understanding or social convention. In this sense reading a scientific paper is different 
from reading certain works of fiction. But then of course, the fact that such symbolic 
features are absent in the scientific case simply means that this does not constitute an 
obstacle to taking imagination to follow a ‘belief-like path’ in this specific case 
(unlike in a fiction, say).21 This removes the second obstacle to regarding imagination 
as ‘belief-like’.  
 Thus, with the idea that the ‘object’ of the imagining is a ‘semi- propositional 
representation’ as sketched above, together with an understanding of the associated 
attitude of belief as belief that such a representation is quasi-true, and an appreciation 
of the relevant style of reasoning in play and any constraints, we have an appropriate 
framework within which we can consider Einstein’s invitation to imagine as 
appropriately ‘belief-like’, in line with what is presented in the rest of his paper. In 
other words, the relevant passages appealing to the imagination can hence be 
considered as an integral and important part of scientific practice as a whole, with 
regard to the epistemic attitude that should be adopted.  
 
8. Imagination and Knowledge 
One might be tempted to go even further and argue, as Williamson does, that 
imagination also provides knowledge (Williamson 2016). In particular, it has been 
widely acknowledged that the exercise of imagination allows us to prepare for certain 
practically relevant possibilities. So, for example, prior to jumping across a stream, 																																																								
21 If an example from science were to be given that does exemplify this sort of move, 
I would argue that it further demonstrates that imagination does play a significant role 
in theorising, just not the sort of ‘belief-like’ role that I am concerned with here. 
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say, we may imagine ourselves doing so, thereby preparing ourselves for the leap. 
Williamson claims that such a capacity has obvious evolutionary advantages, and in 
order to confer them, he suggests, it must be both selective and ‘reality oriented’ and 
must operate both voluntarily and involuntarily, in which respect it resembles 
attention (ibid.). We can choose to imagine succeeding in jumping across the stream, 
or failing, and in this respect the exercise of the imagination is voluntary but having 
chosen a particular initial condition, as it were, the unfolding of the consequences, 
along a particular imaginative path, is involuntary of course (ibid.) 
 There is an immediate objection, however: insofar as this characterisation 
involves only the raising of possibilities, imagination provides, at best, only ‘how-
possibly’ knowledge (cf. Reutlinger et. al. 2018). Thus, when it comes to science, at 
least, this would encourage us to consign imagination to the context of discovery, or 
perhaps of pursuit (see, for example, Nyrup forthcoming; also da Costa and French 
2003 pp. 115-129), rather than that of justification (Williamson 2016), as noted at the 
beginning of this paper. Bracketed off in that way, it may well be belief-like in nature 
but it could not be said to provide ‘how-actually’ knowledge. Nevertheless, 
Williamson argues, in the scientific case, at least, such a bracketing collapses under 
the reliance of science on mathematics, whose first principles are indeed justified via 
‘unashamed appeals to the imagination’ (ibid.).22 Thus he concludes, the role of 
imagination in justification seeps through the body of science via the dependence on 																																																								
22 The discovery-justification distinction is famously problematic of course and itself 
may be taken to collapse, for entirely separate reasons. Indeed, it has been argued that 
the same epistemic attitude can be maintained across both domains, namely that of 
belief in the theory as quasi-true in the above sense (da Costa and French 2003, Ch. 
6). 
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mathematics and hence it can be regarded as providing ‘how-actually’ knowledge 
about the world. 
 This is clearly problematic, dependent as it is on a particular view of the 
foundations of mathematics and its applicability to science. In response, one can 
argue that, even granted the claim that mathematics does involve an ‘unashamed’ 
appeal to the imagination, the relevant dependence of science on mathematics is such 
as to prevent any such seepage. So, for example, if one were to maintain that 
mathematics plays only a representational role in science (Saatsi 2011) such that it 
affords us a grasp on certain physical dependencies (Strevens 2008) then any 
knowledge-via-imagination accruing to the former cannot be taken to be passed on to 
the latter. Thus, the relevant knowledge will be about the mathematics only, and not 
about the world.  
 At this point someone might gesture at two ways in which the mathematical 
intrudes into the physical, allowing for one form of knowledge to blur into the other. 
The first concerns what Wigner called the ‘unreasonable effectiveness’ of 
mathematics in physics (Wigner 1960), which might suggest some form of 
dependence between the two that prevents us from drawing such a hard and fast 
distinction when it comes to providing knowledge. However, the apparently 
unreasonable nature of this effectiveness evaporates when we consider actual 
examples in all the relevant detail and note the moves made to bring both the relevant 
mathematics and physical theory into contact (Bueno and French 2018). The second 
concerns the purported role of mathematics in explanation (see, for example, Baker 
2009). Again, if it could be convincingly argued that mathematics plays an 
ineliminable role in explanations of physical phenomena, then insofar as we have 
justifications of the relevant beliefs and the explanations are factive, it could be 
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concluded that the mathematics provides knowledge of the world. However, such 
arguments can be undermined through, again, a closer examination of the role played 
by the mathematics in specific cases (Saatsi 2011; Bueno and French 2018, Ch. 9) 
which reveals, again, that this is only representational; and so, again, this conclusion 
can be resisted.   
 More generally, it has been argued that we need to supplement our imaginings 
on any matter with certain background information and in particular when it comes to 
scientific cases, recalling the previously noted point about constraints, relevant 
theoretical knowledge pertaining to the subject matter at hand (Spaulding 2016; Stuart 
forthcominga and forthcomingb). Imagination on its own cannot go beyond the ‘how-
possible’ to provide knowledge of the world (but then, neither of course can belief!).  
 In this context, the above distinction between how-possibly and how-actually 
knowledge is reflected in Salis’ contrast between knowledge claims about the 
imaginary system under consideration and knowledge claims about reality generated 
via the imagination (Salis forthcoming). In the case of Einstein’s paper, the former 
pertain to the possible behaviour of the (idealised) clocks and rods as set out in that 
paper and the latter to the actual behaviour of actual clocks and rods as incorporated 
within concrete physical systems. It is the latter, of course, that comes to be 
represented as evidence about which we hold factual beliefs. Knowledge claims about 
imaginary set-ups play an important role in helping to establish knowledge claims 
about reality, just as mathematics does, but of course, the point remains, that such 
establishment is ultimately only achieved via engagement with reality, by means of 
observation (of some form or other), say.  
 Thus, we can maintain that imagination in science is belief-like, in the above 
sense, and in that sense is on a par with the other relevant elements of scientific 
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practice in general, without committing ourselves to the view that in and of itself, it 
provides knowledge. 
 
9. Final Remarks 
Certainly there is more to say about the role of imagination in such practice and its 
engagement with these other elements and forms of reasoning that are involved.  My 
intention here is primarily just to emphasise that it does play some such role and that 
it can be situated within a unitary epistemic framework, namely one shaped by 
representational belief and the notion of quasi-truth. On the one hand, as already 
indicated, this allows us to accommodate imagination within a framework that also 
captures other features of scientific practice, such as models and idealisations, for 
example (da Costa and French 2003). Furthermore, given the critical role that 
imagination is typically taken to play in scientific creativity, such an accommodation 
may then be viewed as placing the latter notion more centrally within the philosophy 
of science. 
 On the other hand, we might speculate that the above framework of 
representational belief might be extended further into the epistemology of imagination 
itself. We recall that Sperber’s notion of a ‘semi-propositional representation’ was 
originally proposed to bring ‘into the fold’, as it were, apparently irrational beliefs, as 
in the case of the old man and the dragon. Consider also ‘pretense behaviour’ and the 
issue of how that relates to belief (for a quick summary, see Liao and Gendler 2019): 
viewed from a ‘Sperberian’ perspective, we may see such behaviour in a new light 
that allows us to sidestep the traditional division between regarding belief and 
imagination as existing on a continuum and taking the latter as reducible to the 
former. Likewise, consider the comparison between imagination and so-called 
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‘episodic’ memory (memory involving mental content about one’s own past): how 
significant should we take the apparent differences between the two (ibid.)? 
Michaelian, for example, has recently argued that such memories are an 
evolutionarily adaptive form of imagining, involving representations with content that 
goes beyond that of past representations (2016). With remembering understood as a 
kind of imaginative simulating on Michaelian’s account, the framework of semi-
propositional representations and quasi-truth may help alleviate certain concerns 
regarding such a constructivist approach. However, this is all to step well beyond the 
issues touched on in this paper. 
 Finally, and returning to the latter issues, the role of the above kinds of 
invitations and of imagination in general in papers like Einstein’s, and other examples 
of scientific work, reveals that the set of practices involved in such work and our 
engagement with those practices (through reading papers, listening to talks etc.) is 
more complex and heterogeneous than it is often portrayed. Having said that, it is also 
noteworthy that we can begin to make sense of that complexity and heterogeneity by 
productively importing certain moves and devices from the philosophy of art into our 
considerations of such practices within the philosophy of science, whilst also 
acknowledging the differences between the two domains and the limitations of such 
devices. Although it is not the case that all the features attributed to the imagination 
when it comes to fictions, for example, can be straightforwardly carried over to 
scientific theories, the extent to which we can draw on the former to illuminate the 
nature of the latter is significant and suggests that the philosopher of science might 
profitably view the philosophy of art as offering a useful set of tools to be 
appropriated and deployed in the service of a better understanding of science (subject 
to relevant caveats, of course; see French 2020).  
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